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Introduction 
Climate change and sufficient energy supply are repeatedly addressed as two of the key chal-
lenges of our time. The promotion of shale gas is seen by some as an opportunity to meet both 
of these challenges while stimulating economic growth. The production of shale gas requires 
the implementation of hydraulic fracturing or »fracking«, which is the topic of an ongoing con-
troversy in many countries. There are uncertainties and discussions about the actual risks and 
benefits of this approach. 
The case study on fracking in Austria contributes to the Res-AGorA project by shedding light on 
the societal dynamics surrounding the introduction of a technology that is still under develop-
ment and thereby provides insight on (1) how different actor groups frame and act towards 
this technology, (2) what governance arrangements were applicable, (3) how responsibility 
was facilitated regarding research and development (R&D) and the implementation of frack-
ing, and (4) lessons to be learned for RRI governance of technologies of this type. 
The study at hand provides an example of a technology that carries high expectations and that 
is a topic of global debate while at the same time directly affecting a local population. R&D on 
a clean fracking approach is crucial because it has the potential to reduce negative effects. 
  
2 
However, the development process itself poses a risk to the local environment due to large 
scale in-situ testing. 
The pilot-case study is based on comprehensive desk-based research (document analysis, me-
dia analysis, etc.) and participant observation. Furthermore, problem-centered interviews with 
relevant actors in Austria and a comparative analysis of fracking in Austria and the United 
Kingdom will be conducted in the next months.  
Key findings of the study on fracking and the governance of Responsible Research and Innova-
tion (RRI) are: 
 The assessment of fracking by societal actors differs depending on the temporal 
alignment, the spatial orientation, and their level of confidence in the compliance of 
the actors with regulations and best practices. 
 It is one of the biggest challenges for an RRI governance framework to consider and to 
bring together these different interests, perspectives, and worldviews in regards to re-
search and innovation (R&I) and to find a way of dealing with (apparently) incompati-
ble positions. 
 A certain level of trust is important to convey information and facilitate a dialogue in 
negotiation processes. In order to facilitate trust, it would be beneficial to increase 
transparency of decision-making process, implement participatory approaches (e.g. 
pTA), and provide information by independent organizations, which assesses opportu-
nities and risks of technologies in a non-partisan manner. 
 At the same time, public and political controversies can be important factors in initiat-
ing legislative efforts that promote RRI. 
 Adaptation of existing governance arrangements, like EIA legislation, might be appro-
priate and practical concerning R&D in certain areas. However, in the case at hand, no 
EIA was conducted. Therefore, its effectiveness is uncertain.  
 Prevailing societal conditions (such as the actor and media landscape, political circum-
stances, civil society, and general attitudes towards technology, the environment, etc.) 
seem to be crucial and have to be considered, but further research is necessary to bet-
ter understand their effects. 
Hydraulic Fracturing – »Fracking« 
Fracking is a technique that is (foremost) employed in the process of drilling for and extracting 
natural gas. Though fracking has also been used for stimulation of conventional gas wells, 
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fracking is essential for mining unconventional gas1 reservoirs where “the gas is tightly stored 
in the rock itself [whereas] in conventional gas reservoirs, the gas is stored in pore spaces be-
tween individual grains” (Sjolander et al. 2011: 1). Through the high-pressure insertion of 
fracking fluids into a well, rock formations are broken up, i.e. fractures are produced that ena-
ble the trapped gas to flow, which is then captured. In most cases, the fracking fluid primarily 
consists of water2, various compositions of chemical additives (IEA 2012: 33; Boling 2012: 263-
264; 3LegsResources 2011), and sand that acts as a proppant and keeps the fractures open so 
that they provide a constant stream of gas (Montgomery and Smith 2010: 27-30; Robbins 
2013: 1143-1147; Sjolander et al. 2011),. Overall water consumption is relative to the size of 
the fracked area as well as other geological factors. Estimations of water consumption vary3. 
The chemical additives have different functions. They can act as a friction reducer, anticorro-
sive, biocide, stabilizer or dissolvent (EPA 2012: 197-228). When the pressure after injection 
declines, a part of the fracking fluid (flowback) and other liquids/substances (produced water) 
are pushed back to the surface over time. These wastewaters4, which are stored in dumps or 
tanks on the drilling site, can be reused for further fracking or have to be treated, recycled or 
permanently stored in a deposit (EPA 2012: 18; Sjolander et al. 2011: 5; IEA 2012: 33). Estima-
tions of the total volume of recovered fracking fluids vary5 (McIlvaine and James 2010: 17; 
Sjolander et al. 2011:5; EPA 2012:19; Olsson et al. 2013). 
Fracking is not an entirely new technology, but it has gained importance in the last years. The 
idea of stimulating wells can be traced back to the mid-19th century, when wells were »shot« 
with explosives (Montgomery and Smith 2010). Since the first implementation of hydraulic 
fracturing (i.e. using fluids for stimulation) in the 1940s, several technical developments were 
made that altered the characteristics and effects of this technology; these include develop-
ments in: the pumping and blending of fracking fluids and proppants, the fracking treatment 
design (computer calculations, imaging/mapping technology), the monitoring of and ability to 
adjust the process, and the improvement of fracking fluids. Furthermore, horizontal drilling is 
seen as playing an important role in the rise of fracking (Montgomery and Smith 2010; 
Sjolander et al. 2011; Robbins 2013: 1144-1146). Horizontal drilling is credited with making 
                                               
1
 Although one type of unconventional gas is coalbed methane (IEA 2012: 18) we will focus on 
fracking used in the process of mining shale and tight gas. 
2
 Data varies slightly between “>98%” (3LegsResources 2011), “over 99%” (IEA 2012: 33), 
“98%-99,5%” (Boling 2012) and 99,5% (Sjolander et al. 2011: 5). 
3
 3.800-34.100m³ (Sjolander et al. 2011: 4), up to 30.300m³ (Robbins 2013: 1143), 3.800-
18.900m³ (IEA 2012: 30) or 17.000m³ for “a typical well” (3LegsResources 2011) are indi-
cated in the literature. 
4
 For a comprehensive overview of chemicals found in wastewater see EPA (2012: 240-243). 
5 25% “in the first few days” (McIlvaine and James 2010: 17); “8 to 10% of stimulation fluids […] 
in the first 30 days” and “a large percentage […] over the next several months” but it “is still 
unclear what percentage remains unaccounted for” (Sjolander et al 2011: 5; example of 
wells in Pennsylvania, USA); Olson et al. (2013) analysed samples of wells in Germany 
with 31% of the flowback being fracking fluid and 69% water from the formation.  
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fracking efficient enough to be profitable. Although the “first recorded true horizontal well” 
(Energy Information Administration 1993: 7) dates back to 1929 and although horizontal wells 
were drilled in several countries in the following decades (Joshi 1991: 7-12; King 2012: 2-3), 
“little practical application occurred until the early 1980’s” (Energy Information Administration 
1993: 7) when new drilling technology (i.a. down hole drilling motor) was developed (ibid. 7; 
DOE 2009: 3). Other techniques that changed the process of fracking and its outcome include 
the injection of high volumes of fracking fluids (massive hydraulic fracturing) and multi-stage 
fracking (Fitzgerald 2013: 1340). 
Fitzgerald (2013: 1338) cuts right to core when he describes today’s fracking as “a distillation 
of advances made over several decades”. Today, fracking and its related technologies are con-
stantly developing, resulting in corresponding changes in their practices and effects. 
A number of factors have been identified that promoted the rise of unconventional gas (shale 
gas revolution or boom) in the USA over the last decade. Besides the previously mentioned 
technical developments, additional contributing factors include: tax credits for unconventional 
gas, state funding of R&D in this area (Stevens 2012: 9; Wang and Krupnick 2013: 6), the high 
market price of gas in the 2000s (Wang and Krupnick 2013: 15-29), the absence of legal regula-
tions on fracking
6 (Boling 2012: 265-267; Robbins 2013), private land and mineral rights owner-
ship, the beneficial geological conditions, disposability of large amounts of water, pre-
existence of infrastructure (Wang and Krupnick 2013), low population density in the surround-
ing area, and a tradition of oil and gas production (ibid.; IEA 2012: 122; Vidic et al. 2013: 
1235009-6; Kinnaman 2011: 1243).  
Assessment of Fracking 
The assessment of fracking is complex and revolves around several intertwined issues. Fracking 
cannot be discussed in isolation. It combines several technologies, each of which is associated 
with different risks and benefits that not only sum up but also produce new impacts. It is not 
possible to give a definitive definition of fracking. Fracking a vertical well with nitrogen to elim-
inate obstructions is different from fracking several stages of a horizontal well several times 
with a fracking fluid with a complex composition. 
The evaluation of future technological developments and their implementation (e.g., water 
treatment technology, environmentally friendly fracking fluids), level of confidence in the 
management of the operations by oil and gas companies (e.g. compliance with regulations and 
best practices), estimation methodology (e.g. for calculating energy output), the data used and 
its interpretation (e.g. on leaked gas) are crucial in the assessment of fracking. Some assess-
ments employ best-case scenarios, some worst-case scenarios and others build upon a combi-
                                               
6
 Exemption from the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act. 
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nation of alternative scenarios. In the face of uncertainty, different authors abide by the pre-
cautionary principle and call for strong regulatory oversight or even a moratorium; others de-
termine that the existing regulations are sufficient and call for fracking operations to proceed 
with ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and R&D. 
The fact that some studies are directly or indirectly financed by the oil and gas industry has to 
be mentioned, although this does not necessarily mean that their results are categorically mis-
leading since most of them are peer-reviewed. Examples of such studies include the work of 
Stephenson et al. (2011) for Shell Global Solutions and Molofsky et al. (2013) for GSI Environ-
mental Inc. (Texas, USA), which has clients such as British Petroleum America, ExxonMobil, and 
Schlumberger, or for the Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation. The fracking-critical work of Howarth 
et al. (2011), on the other hand, is also accused of partisanship by proponents of fracking be-
cause of financial sponsoring by the “anti-fracking” Park Foundation (Entine 2012). 
Environmental Pollution 
One of the most debated issues surrounding the production of unconventional gas through 
fracking is that of groundwater and drinking water pollution (Kargbo et al. 2010: 5681; Rahm 
and Riha 2012: 13). Potential risks can arise from the chemicals added to the fracking fluid and 
the substances released from the fracked formation (Rozell and Reaven 2012; Gregory et al. 
2011: 183). There are several documented cases of contamination as a result of case-leakages 
or spilling accidents (Bamberger and Oswald 2012: 56-59). However, there is only one docu-
mented case of “direct groundwater pollution resulting from injection of hydraulic fracturing 
chemicals” (Vidic et al. 2013:6). Such migration of polluted water between rock-formations is 
generally assessed as being unlikely (IEA 2012: 35-38; Rozell and Reaven 2012). But because 
there are often many wells within close proximity to each other, “cumulative impacts […] that 
develop so slowly that they are hard to measure” (Vidic et al. 2013: 6) cannot be ruled out. 
Besides the fracking fluid itself, the produced water is crucial because, even with a non-toxic 
and harmless composition of the fracking fluid, the recovered water will contain potentially 
hazardous substances (Bamberger and Oswald 2012: 52; Kargbo et al. 2010: 5681). “Techno-
logically-enhanced naturally occurring radioactive material”, that exceeded regulatory guide-
line values by more than 800 percent, was found in open pits near drilling sites (Rich and Cros-
by 2013: 124). At the moment, processing and reuse of flowback for further fracking is con-
strained by technical requirements for fracking fluids (e.g. viscosity) and adequate treatment 
of non-reusable fluids is limited by factors such as technical possibilities, economic viability, 
infrastructure, geology, etc. (Gregory et al. 2012: 184; Olsson et al, 2013). 
There are also concerns about the contamination of drinking water with methane. This poten-
tial effect of fracking also garnered much public attention due to its depiction in the 2010 doc-
umentary movie Gasland (Robbins 2013: 1148). Higher methane concentrations were detected 
in water wells near (<1km) active fracking sites than in other wells in the same region, most 
probably as a result of case-leakages (Osborn et al. 2011). These results are challenged by 
some (Davies 2011; Schon 2011; Saba and Orzechowski 2011; Molofsky et al. 2013), i.a. stating 
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that contamination instead correlates with “topography and groundwater geochemistry” 
(Molofsky et al. 2013: 347). These results have also been defended (Osborn et al. 2011a) and 
affirmed (Jackson et al. 2013). 
In defense of fracking it is claimed that some of the discovered toxins originate from sources 
other than the oil and gas industry, like agriculture, and that the direct connection between 
fracking and water pollution has not been scientifically proven (King 2012: 7-9, 33-35). Fur-
thermore, it is said that chemicals only account for 1% to 2% of fracking fluids and that efforts 
(R&D in this area) are being made to make fracking fluids even cleaner (Eaton 2013: 161; King 
2012: 7-9). For example, there have been attempts to replace water with liquid-CO2 in horizon-
tal fracking. This approach could make fracking more efficient because of the chemical dynam-
ics between CO2 and shale (Ishida et al. 2012) and cleaner by reducing produced wastewater 
and offering the possibility of CO2 storage (Bullis 2013; Godec et al. 2013). 
Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Unconventional gas is promoted as a way of reducing carbon emissions because it is assessed 
as a cleaner form of energy than coal, thus buying time while efficient renewable energy tech-
nologies are developed (Tour et al. 2010). However, there are different estimates of how much 
unconventional gas (production and consumption) contributes to overall greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions compared to other sources of energy (especially conventional gas, coal, and 
oil).  
A key issue in this regard is how much methane (a gas with a greater greenhouse effect but 
shorter lifespan in the atmosphere than CO2) is emitted during production, transportation, and 
use of unconventional gas. There are different ways in which gas may be emitted: purposeful 
venting, fugitive (e.g. through leaks in pipelines) or incidental emissions (e.g. rupture of 
equipment) might occur and, eventually, the gas is not burned completely (IEA 2012: 38-42). 
A study conducted by Howarth et al. (2011: 687) concludes that, over a “20-year horizon, the 
GHG footprint for shale gas is at least 20% greater than and perhaps more than twice as great 
as that for coal when expressed per quantity of energy available during combustion” and “over 
the 100-year frame […] comparable to coal”. These results are challenged due to alleged 
methodological flaws (e.g., the use of heat content instead of produced electricity as variable), 
conclusions based on false assumptions (e.g. amount of leaked methane), and overall weak 
data (Cathles et al. 2011). Nevertheless, Howarth et al. (2012) insist on their results. 
Several other studies (Burnham et al. 2012; Hultman et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2011; Stephenson 
et al. 2011; O’Sullivan and Paltsev 2012) arrive at the result that unconventional gas has a low-
er GHG impact than coal. Reviewing some of these studies, Weber and Clavin (2012: 5893) 
point out that the research design (e.g. the timeframe analyzed, the gas basin, the technology 
used, the variables measured, etc.) and the underlying assumptions have severe effects on the 
results. A lack of data (e.g. on fugitive emissions, venting or flaring) is seen as a major problem 
(Burnham et al. 2012: 625-626; Howarth et al. 2011: 688; Hultman et al. 2011: 8; Weber and 
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Clavin 2012: 5893). However, the difficulty may be more profound. In this regard, the state-
ment by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2012: 39), that “by their very nature, these 
emissions are difficult to quantify”, is telling. 
Furthermore, the possibility remains that a market driven dynamic can reduce the positive 
effect of unconventional gas on the global carbon footprint. As coal is substituted by natural 
gas in the US, it will become cheaper on the international market and be used to a greater 
extent in other regions, like Europe. In combination with a price decrease of CO2 certificates, 
the financial incentives to invest in sustainable sources of energy may degrade (Bräuninger et 
al. 2013: 26-27). 
Public Health 
Negative effects on public health resulting from fracking might derive from water, air, noise, or 
light pollution as well as from social stress due to rapid changes in societal structures (Korf-
macher et al. 2013). A negative impact on health might result from direct exposure (air) or 
intake (water) as well as indirect intake, e.g. of food produced in contaminated areas (Rich and 
Crosby 2013: 125-126). These issues are closely linked to the question, whether or not there 
are emissions and leakages from unconventional gas production and how waste is treated and 
disposed. 
Several substances contained in fracking fluids (Riedl et al. 2013; Tyndall Centre 2011: 56; Col-
born et al. 2011) as well as different radionuclides found in wastewater (Rich and Crosby 2013: 
125-127) have been identified as potentially harmful to living organisms as well as to human 
and animal health. However, there is currently a lack of understanding of the mechanisms by 
which radionuclides are transferred from contaminated pits to plants, animals, and humans 
(ibid. 131). The impact of methane in drinking water on human health is not clear yet either 
(Osborn et al. 2011: 8176). The US Department of Energy (DOE 2009: 70-71) assesses the gen-
eral risk of radiation from oil and gas operations as “negligible” (ibid. 71), taking into account 
the regulations that are in place, practices in the oil and gas industry, low levels of radiation, 
and fact that the “general public does not come into contact with oilfield equipment for ex-
tended periods”. But, Rich and Crosby (2013:128-131) point to several holes and exemptions in 
state and federal regulations. 
Regional air pollution from fracking and unconventional gas production operations is also iden-
tified as a problem (Perry 2013: 40). Such air pollution could lead to a higher risk of sub-chronic 
diseases and/or cancer for people that live near wells (McKenzie et al. 2012). Determinate 
findings are limited due to factors such as a lack of data and risk assessments of several toxins 
(ibid. 86). Acknowledging the air pollution resulting from gas production, the DOE (2009: 77) 
states that, “[gas] field emissions are controlled and minimized through a combination of gov-
ernment regulation and voluntary avoidance, minimization, and mitigation strategies”. 
Studies have recorded the health problems of humans and animals living close to unconven-
tional gas production sites (Bamberger and Oswald 2012; Steinzor et al. 2013). However, the 
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ability of these to establish a link between health problems and gas drilling activities are lim-
ited due to a lack of data (e.g. pre-drilling contamination), small sample sizes, and non-
systematic approaches (ibid. 55, 70). 
Besides the possible negative impacts, there might also be positive impacts of fracking and 
unconventional gas production on public health. Economic growth associated with the rise of 
fracking might lead to better health care provision and nutrition (Korfmacher et al. 2013: 15). 
Economic Impact 
Fracking and unconventional gas production are seen as drivers of the economy: jobs are cre-
ated in the gas industry and in supplying branches (e.g. construction, trade, transportation), 
governmental tax revenue is increased, and the gas price is lowered, thus promoting other 
branches of the economy and providing cheap energy to households (i.a. Gold 2012; DOE 
2009: 3-4). Considine et al. (2009: 31) come to the conclusion that in 2008, the gas industry in 
Marcellus Shale created “a total economic impact of $2,3 billion, 29.000 jobs, and $240 million 
in state and local tax revenue”. It is expected that these numbers will further increase over a 
ten-year timeframe (175.000 jobs, $13 billion added value, and $12 billion tax revenue). 
Unconventional gas production is also seen as a way of getting closer to independency from 
foreign sources of energy and therefore as way of strengthening the political position of a 
country against other countries (McGowan 2012: 8-9).  
Several studies with very positive assessments of fracking (directly or indirectly) that were 
financed by the gas and oil industry (e.g. Considine et al. 2009) are criticized for methodologi-
cal shortcomings, deficient cost-benefit-models, and unrealistic assumptions of financial flow 
that lead to an overestimation of the net benefit of unconventional gas drilling for a region or 
state (Kinnaman 2011). Furthermore, “overly optimistic gas reserve and production assump-
tions were used” (Barth 2013: 86). The non-consideration or underestimation of externalities, 
such as environmental pollution, wear of infrastructure, etc., is another problem of these stud-
ies. There is even a suspicion that productivity and total amount of unconventional gas re-
sources are intentionally overestimated by the industry in order to attract investors (Urbina 
2011). 
Barth (2013) identifies three factors that might affect the regional net benefit of unconven-
tional gas production and are excluded in many estimations: (1) the natural resource curse, 
which describes a negative correlation between the wealth of a country in terms of natural 
resources and its economic growth; (2) long-term negative economic effects that may follow a 
boom (cycle of boom and bust); and (3) negative local socio-economic effects (poverty, ine-
quality). These tendencies can be met by business diversification, investments in education, 
etc. Looking at the economic development of drilling counties in the Barnett Shale region be-
tween 2003 and 2010, there is a lower increase in GDP per household and there are higher 
levels of unemployment than in other Texan counties (ibid.). 
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Further concerns – especially worries about the effect on tourism – over the impact of fracking 
are linked to its impact on the flora and fauna as well as to the alteration of the landscape in 
general. Fracking is not only accompanied with visual and audible disturbances but also with 
increased road traffic. Fracking might therefore have a negative effect on an existing local 
economy that depends on an unspoiled or peaceful countryside. Even if there is no or just little 
pollution, the image of a region can be compromised by gas mining. These opportunity costs 
have to be taken into consideration when estimating the net benefits of unconventional gas 
production, but are often omitted (Rumbach 2011; Barth 2013: 93). 
Due to the importation of workers from other regions, there may be an increase in social ser-
vice costs as well as maintenance costs for infrastructure due to intensified use. There are also 
indications that property values decrease due to negative environmental impacts and that it 
can become more difficult to find insurance. Negative health effects – as discussed above – 
might lead to higher public health care costs and result in a loss of value of agricultural proper-
ties (Barth 2013: 94-96). Still there “are many uncertainties regarding the long-term impacts 
on local and regional economies” (ibid. 92). 
Other impacts 
In general, production of unconventional gas by means of fracking has a bigger effect on the 
landscape than conventional drilling because of the higher well density in an area (IEA 2012: 
19-20). 
The water consumption of fracking is another concern, especially in generally dry regions 
(Kargbo et al. 2010: 5681). The water consumption of fracking has increased over the past due 
to longer horizontal wells and a rising number of hydraulic fracturing stages (Nicot and Scanlon 
2012: 3582). Compared to conventional gas, tight and shale gas production have higher water 
consumption (per terajoule of output). To some extent, the associated water consumption lies 
within the range of conventional oil production (IEA 2012: 31). King (2012: 40) states that, 
“volumes of water used for fracturing are low in comparison to agricultural, municipal, recrea-
tion and other industrial use, but large volume well development in an arid area can produce 
water shortage” (King 2012: 40). The DOE (2009: 64-66) makes a similar assessment and points 
to strategic water management that can decrease the input of local water supply and the pos-
sibility of treating and recycling used water to the extent that “additional water resources for 
drought-stricken or arid areas” are provided (ibid. 70). 
Other concerns relate to unknown long-term effects on the biosphere, both negative (pollu-
tion, loss of habitat, biomass and biodiversity, etc.) and positive (creation of new habitats) 
(Kiviat 2013). Zero-loss management and the reduction of the number of well pads could min-
imize the negative effects of gas production on animals and the environment (e.g. for chemi-
cals) (Ladlee and Jacquet 2011). However, it is unlikely that they will be fully eliminated (Kiviat 
2013: 9).  
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Another environmental issue that is linked to fracking is the topic of earthquakes caused by 
fracking operations and related practices such as subsequent wastewater injection. Hydraulic 
fracturing generally induces imperceptible micro-earthquakes. However, there are several 
cases where bigger earthquakes have been attributed to fracking operations. Studies have 
linked the rise in the number of earthquakes in the USA to an increase in deep-water injections 
(Ellsworth 2013; Elst et al. 2013). The wastewater injection, for disposal after the fracking and 
production of unconventional gas is done, has been identified as the main cause of these 
earthquakes. Others (King 2012: 45-49) deny the correlation between fracking and stronger 
earthquakes because no statistically significant correlation has been found between larger 
earthquakes and the introduction of fracking. 
 Fracking in Austria 
Emergence of the Topic (2010-2011) 
The first public accounts on shale gas test drillings conducted by the OMV in the Vienna Basin 
can be found in January 2010 (Wiener Zeitung 2010) and in the following months (Die Presse 
2010; Kurier 2010). Most of these form small parts of reports on the success-story of shale gas 
in the USA. The notion of Russia as having been overtaken by the USA in gas production (i.a. 
Kurier 2010; Der Standard 2010) and the hope of gaining independence from Russian gas 
through shale gas production in Europe are recurring themes (i.a. Die Presse 2010; Der Stand-
ard 2010b). The latter issue remains present in media coverage of shale gas over the next 
years. 
At this time, there are also first comments on the potential limitations of unconventional gas 
production in Europe and Austria. The chairman of the OMV states that production and espe-
cially drilling costs for shale gas are higher in the Vienna Basin because the shale gas deposits 
lie deeper than in US plays (Kurier 2010). Others point to further limitations of shale gas pro-
duction in Europe when compared to the USA, like higher ecological awareness, population 
density, and concentration of biodiversity (Die Presse 2010). 
In mid-2010, the topic of shale gas emerges in the media once more. Now, the process of shale 
gas production is described in more detail than before, including horizontal drilling and hy-
draulic fracturing. Potential benefits as well as risks are discussed. Poland’s attempt to become 
a major gas producer, and thus becoming more independent from Russia, takes center stage 
(Der Standard 2010a; Die Presse 2010a). Fracking also appears in association with market 
prognoses that predict a price increase for natural gas in the wake of an economic recovery 
following the financial and economic crisis (Wirtschaftsblatt 2010a). 
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In late-2010, there are reports on first operations in Poland by different competing companies 
(Wirtschaftsblatt 2010b, 2010c) and elsewhere in Europe.  First remarks are made about the 
lack of information on these operations provided by oil companies (Wiener Zeitung 2010a). 
Over the next months, there are several articles on the gas price and market, which mention 
shale gas production as an important economic factor (i.a. Wirtschaftsblatt 2011, 2011a; Wie-
ner Zeitung 2011; Oberösterreichische Nachrichten 2011). 
Throughout 2011, shale gas production and fracking remain recurring topics in the Austrian 
media. Especially the issues of gaining independence from foreign – especially Russian – oil 
and gas (Wirtschaftsblatt 2011b; Wiener Zeitung 2011b; Die Presse 2011), the German nuclear 
power phase out (Wirtschaftsblatt 2011c), the proclamation of the “golden age of gas” by the 
IEA (IEA 2011; Wiener Zeitung 2011c; Wirtschaftsblatt 2011d), and shale gas as bridge technol-
ogy to renewable sources of energy (Die Presse 2011a) are picked up. Positive coverage, how-
ever, is always accompanied by indications of the potential negative environmental impacts, 
like groundwater pollution, negative health effects and methane emission.
7
 
Up to this point in time, there is no sign of public resistance against the test drillings or the 
topic in general in Austria. 
Beginning of Controversy (November 2011) 
The issues of unconventional gas production and fracking in Austria gain momentum in No-
vember 2011, when exploration by the OMV in the Vienna Basin definitively reveals a shale gas 
deposit below the Weinviertel (Wine District) in Lower Austria. This is presumed to have the 
potential to supply Austria’s demand for natural gas for about 30 years. At that time, the OMV 
states that they want to conduct information events for the local population and to develop 
and test a new approach to make fracking environmentally friendly; clean fracking is intro-
duced by Gerhard Thonhauser, a professor from Mining University of Leoben (MUL), but not 
explained in detail. Thonhauser only states that a clean fracking method could be developed 
by 2013 (Kurier 2011, 2011a). At this time, first tests are planned for the end of 2012. The 
commercial production of shale gas is not expected before 2020 (Der Standard 2011; Kurier 
2011g) 
The first reaction of the mayors of Poysdorf and Herrnbaumgarten, the two towns affected by 
the OMV’s plans, is positive. They say that they see no environmental risk due to the regula-
tions in place, want to support further development of this technology, and predict positive 
economic impacts on the region such as job creation and increased tax revenue (Kurier 2011b). 
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 There are also articles only dealing with environmental risks, referring i.a. to the study on GHG 
emissions by Howarth et al. 2011 (Wirtschaftsblatt 2011e; Wiener Zeitung 2011a). 
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But there is also instant opposition to the plans of the OMV. Environmental protection groups 
(Greenpeace, Global 2000) criticize shale gas production because of its associated environmen-
tal and health risks (Kurier 2011a; Kronen Zeitung 2011; Global 2000 2011). Nikolaus Berlako-
vich (Austrian Peoples’ Party - ÖVP), the Austrian Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Environ-
ment and Water Management (Ministry of Life) argues against shale gas production and in 
support of environmental protection as well as an energy strategy that promotes renewable 
energy rather than fossil energy (Der Standard 2011; Kurier 2011c). The Green Party demands 
an amendment to the Austrian Mining Law in order to regulate fracking operations. They also 
call for greater investments in renewable energy rather than gas production (Kurier 2011e) 
and for the OMV to act transparently (Die Grünen im NÖ Landtag 2011). Only the Freedom 
Party of Austria (FPÖ) takes up a slightly positive position; they want to wait and see what the 
technological development brings (Krone 2011b; Kurier 2011f). In just a few days, even the 
before mentioned mayors of the affected towns strike a more critical tone, demanding envi-
ronmental protection to be the top priority while not rejecting the possibility of future opera-
tions completely. Similar to the FPÖ, they now hinge this possibility on the applied technology: 
“As long, as there is no clean technique, production will not be accepted in our community” 
(Kronen Zeitung 2011a).  
At the end of November 2011, one week after the discussion was initiated, new information 
about the OMV’s clean fracking method is revealed: the fracking fluid is going to consist of 
water, starch, and sand without further chemical additives. To keep the fluid free of bacteria 
that could impair its functionality and damage the drilling-pipes, ultraviolet rays will be used 
(Kurier 2011g). OMV president Gerhard Roiss places the topic of shale gas and fracking in the 
broader frame of Austria’s economic development. On the one hand, he requests a political 
decision on the topic, on the other hand, he states that the OMV wants to act transparently 
and to produce shale gas with fracking only if it is economically viable and environmentally 
friendly. He estimates that the chance that mining shale gas in Austria actually happens is 20% 
(Kurier 2011h; Die Presse 2011b). 
Critics do not believe the OMV’s promises of an overall clean fracking method; Greenpeace 
refers to an “eco-fairytale” as well as to supposedly unsuccessful attempts by ExxonMobil and 
Halliburton to produce shale gas in an environmentally friendly manner (Greenpeace 2011). 
Concerns that are publically addressed include soil and water pollution with toxins, methane 
migration into drinking water, earthquakes, increase in traffic, CO2 emission, and space con-
sumption of drilling sites and gas pipelines (profil 2011; Kurier 2011i). The latter aspect is seen 
as crucial because the protection of the landscape is important for other branches of the local 
economy such as tourism and wine growing (Wiener Zeitung 2011e). The topic is also an issue 
at the local council where a resolution is passed that addresses the state government. It de-
mands the prohibition of shale gas operations in the region. This demand is backed up by ref-
erences to the associated risk of environmental pollution, consequential negative health im-
pacts as well as to sustainability, referring to an enacted energy strategy. Furthermore, an 
official injunction to the OMV is passed, demanding transparency and public participation on 
the topic (Gemeinderat Mistelbach 2011: 66-68). 
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In December 2011, a citizen’s initiative is founded (BI SCHIEFESgas
8
). Its initiator explains that it 
aims to provide more information from “independent experts” to the local population than the 
OMV does (Wiener Zeitung 2011e). Beyond that, they start a petition against shale gas produc-
tion and fracking in Austria in general (Kurier 2012) and conduct an information event in coop-
eration with Greenpeace on 22 December 2011 (Greenpeace 2011a). 
According to the mayor of Poysdorf, the OMV conducted an information event at the munici-
pal council. This may have had a positive effect on the attitudes of some policymakers towards 
shale gas production in Lower Austria (Wiener Zeitung 2011e). On 23 January 2012, the OMV 
starts to hold public information events for the local communities, reassuring the public that 
they want to produce shale gas with a newly developed, clean fracking technique and that 
they are going to recycle the fracturing fluid in order to save water. The OMV’s business execu-
tive and the head of the department for deep-gas refer to shale gas as a bridge energy and 
point to the OMV’s 60-year-long engagement in this region. Nonetheless, statements from the 
audience – consisting of locals and environmental activists (Kurier 2012b) – remain skeptical of 
or negative towards fracking (Wiener Zeitung 2012; Kurier 2012a). 
In the following weeks, the issue of fracking remains on the political agenda; the Green Party 
now demands a mandatory EIA (Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung - UVP) with local residents 
having the status of a party and thus allowing them to raise an objection against drilling and 
fracking operations. Together with members of citizen’s initiatives (SCHIEFESgas, Risiko-Gas), 
members of the Green Party also deliver a petition against fracking to the President of the 
Austrian Parliament (Wiener Zeitung 2012c; Windbüchler-Souschill et al. 2012). At that time, 
drilling operations are not subject to authorization by the environmental ministry but by the 
ministry of economics. The OMV states, that they already conducted fracking – or at least 
“parts of it” (NÖN 2012) – in the past for conventional, vertical oil and gas drilling (Wiener 
Zeitung 2012a; Der Standard 2012; Der Standard 2012a). This disclosure provokes further out-
rage by opponents of fracking. 
In February 2012, the governor of Lower Austria (Erich Pröll, ÖVP) also demands a change of 
legislation, i.e. an amendment to the UVP in order to regulate and control shale gas production 
and fracking (Kurier 2012c). The topic is discussed at the Landtag (Provincial Council) of Lower 
Austria (NÖ Ltg 2012) and an urgent resolution is passed that requests an amendment of the 
UVP and speaks out against fracking given its uncertain impacts (NÖ Ltg 2012a). For some, a 
mandatory UVP is not enough. The Austrian Environmental Umbrella Organization (Umwelt-
dachverband) and citizens’ initiatives demand a general ban on fracking (Der Standard 2012a; 
Salzburger Nachrichten 2012). 
  
                                               
8
 This is wordplay: Schiefergas is German for shale gas and at the same time, schief means 
crooked. 
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Backpedaling, Regulating, Abandonment of Plans (March-
December 2012) 
At beginning of March 2012, the OMV declares that for the time being there will be no at-
tempts to use fracking and to produce shale gas in Austria. They explain that they have made 
this decision in response to public concerns over fracking. Simultaneously, they state that the 
objective of finding an environmentally friendly way of mining shale gas in Austria will remain 
on their agenda (Der Standard 2012b). In the following months, the president of the OMV re-
peatedly expresses the need for a European strategy regarding shale gas production (Kurier 
2012e; Wirtschaftsblatt 2012; Die Presse 2012). 
In May 2012, the Minister of Life (Berlakovich, ÖVP) tables an amendment to the UVP law that 
i. a. makes a UVP mandatory for fracking and gives NGOs a voice in the process
9
, while also 
abbreviating the overall proceeding (UVP-G Novelle 2012a). Berlakovich sees this as a step to 
promote renewable energy, also because small green energy facilities are exempted from as-
sessment (Kurier 2012f). On 5th July 2012, the ruling parties – the Social Democratic Party of 
Austria (SPÖ) and ÖVP - pass the amendment to the UVP. Now, fracking – even for exploratory 
and test drilling – is subjected to a preceding EIA and environmental organizations have party 
status in the determination procedure. For members of the Green Party this is not enough; 
they further demand that not only NGOs but also local residents be granted the right to initiate 
a UVP and that fracking be banned entirely. On the opposite, members of the FPÖ fear that 
the new UVP will have negative effects on the Austrian economy. Generally, the parliamentar-
ian opposition agrees that the consultation process on the UVP-G amendment was too short, 
leaving little time for negotiation and assessment (Österreichisches Parlament 2012a). 
In September 2012, the OMV announces that they will abandon the plan to produce shale gas 
in Lower Austria. They explain that in this situation – referring to the amendment of the UVP 
law – and for the time being, shale gas production and fracking would not be economically 
viable. But they also state, that there is interest in their development of clean fracking interna-
tionally (Der Standard 2012d). According to a researcher at the MUL, they are working on a 
clean fracking method in the laboratory and are not yet able to test it on a larger scale (der-
Standard.at 2012a).  
In an Interview in December 2012, the OMV’s president Gerhard Roiss states that the coopera-
tion with the MUL to develop a clean fracking approach has come to an end because of the 
need for an environmental assessment even prior to any testing of this new technique (Die 
Presse 2012a). Nonetheless, research continues on a fracking method with liquid-gas instead 
of water that will not be tested in Austria (Kurier 2013c). In an interview, another researcher 
                                               
9
 This is also necessary because there is an EU-directive (85/337/EWG) that has to be imple-
mented. 
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explains that work on “[identifying and developing] materials, techniques and processes that 
are entirely harmless”
10
 (Kurier 2013d) is ongoing. 
Current situation 
Although the OMV has said that it has no plans to conduct hydraulic fracturing in Austria, lo-
cals and opponents of fracking remain distrustful. This distrust is fueled by operations of Halli-
burton in the Weinviertel, which are a part of conventional oil production according to the 
OMV. These operations are observed and documented by citizens’ initiatives (derstandard.at 
2013). 
There are several actors who take a positive stand regarding shale gas production and even 
deem it as necessary, especially for economic development. The head economist of the Inter-
national Energy Association (IEA), Fatih Birol, regards environmentally friendly shale gas pro-
duction in Europe as essential and profitable, despite all intervening factors, if conducted 
properly, i.e. according to the “golden rules” (Kurier 2013b). The Austrian Minister of Economy 
states that the economic circumstances will make it necessary to produce shale gas by means 
of fracking. In this regard, acceptance by the public is crucial for him (Die Presse 2013a). Inter-
national competition is a prevailing topic because the voestalpine – an Austrian steel company 
– makes a large capital investment in Texas – and thus not in Austria – in order to build and run 
an iron facility, i. a. because of the low gas price (Salzburger Nachrichten 2013; Kurier 2013, 
2013e). 
Shale gas production remains present in the Austrian media. On the one hand, articles high-
light the false expectations regarding the potential of shale gas (Salzburger Nachrichten 2013a; 
Der Standard 2013) and its negative environmental impact (Vorarlberger Nachrichten 2013; 
Der Standard 2013a). On the other hand, they also point to its potential to stimulate the econ-
omy (Format 2013) and to reduce GHG emissions (Die Presse 2013b). As of September 2013, 
citizens’ initiatives are still active, e.g. conducting information events. Furthermore, a theater 
play dealing with fracking is on tour in Austria (Schwarzer Veltliner
11
 online), which presents a 
critical view on fracking and its proponents, but also highlights the double standards of its op-
ponents (OBS 2013a). 
  
                                               
10
 “Materialien, Techniken und Prozesse zu identifizieren oder zu entwickeln, die nachweislich 
völlig unbedenklich sind” 
11 Green Veltliner is a sort of wine grape cultivated specially in Austria. “Schwarzer Veltliner”, 
“Black Veltliner”, the title of the play, links drilling and fracking activities with potential envi-
ronmental pollution, turning the normally white wine black. 
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RRI Governance Arrangements 
In the following section, several governance arrangements are elucidated that may be applica-
ble to hydraulic fracturing as well as developments in this area and that have the potential to 
promote RRI. Later on we will have a closer look at how RRI governance has actually taken 
place. 
The identified governance arrangements are of different types. There is hard law (EIA-Act, 
MinroG) and soft law (Austrian Energy Strategy - AES, OMV CSR strategy) as well as curricular 
arrangements at the University of Leoben, where R&D on fracking takes place. 
The governance instruments can also be distinguished based on their temporal orientation: 
whereas the legal acts (EIA-Act, MinroG) address immediate objectives, like the protection of 
the environment from effects of concrete projects, the strategy papers have more far-reaching 
purposes, like the transformation of the Austrian energy system (AES). 
Environmental Impact Assessment (UVP-G 2000) 
When the topic of fracking was introduced in Austria, the EIA was the instrument that was at 
the center of discussions about its governance. 
In Austria, EIAs are regulated in the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 2000 (UVP-G 
2000
12
). Its predecessor was passed in 1993 – after a long and conflict-filled process that start-
ed in the 1970s (Tálos and Kittel 2001: 211) – in order to adapt the Austrian regulatory frame-
work to the directive by the European Community (85/337/EWG) (Umweltausschuss 1993: 1). 
It has since been adapted several times, partly because of new directives by the European Un-
ion (e.g. 97/11/EG), partly due to practical experiences (UVP-G 2000a; Baumgartner/Petek 
2010). Since the 2012 amendment, hydraulic fracturing is subsumed under the EIA-Act. 
The law making process of the EIA-Act fits into the general picture of the legislative process in 
Austria. In most cases, the government prepares laws and law making processes tend to be 
quite closed (Griessler 2012: 72-73). When it comes to environmental policy, however, the 
ignition spark for change frequently comes from civil society (Tálos and Kittel 2001: 206-208) 
or from bodies of the European Union (Pesendorfer and Lauber 2006: 674). 
The EIA-Act was (partly) initiated by pressure from the outside (EU, civil society). It was pre-
pared by the government, the executive branch to be exact, and passed by the governing par-
ties in parliament in 1993 and since amended several times. The process was similar for the 
EIA-Act amendment of 2012, where the government acted because of (i.a.) public and political 
pressure in the wake of the protests against fracking in Lower Austria, as well as a reasoned 
                                               
12 In its current form (August 2013). 
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opinion by the European Commission against Austria – because of the partial non-
implementation of an EU-directive (2011/92/EU). 
The purpose of the EIA is to identify, describe and assess the direct and indirect effects of a 
project on humans, animals and plants, on their habitat, on the environment (soil, water, air, 
climate, landscape) and on cultural assets involving public participation on a basis of profes-
sional knowledge. Furthermore, better alternatives that reduce or minimize negative effects 
have to be examined and the effects if the project is not conducted have to be estimated (§1 
UVP-G 2000). As the competent authority, the Ministry of Life defines precaution, comprehen-
siveness and integration, improvement of project planning, integration of environmental con-
cerns into decision making, transparency and involvement of the public as objectives of the EIA 
(Lebensministerium 2012). It has also been characterized as being informative, precautionary, 
coordinating and pacifying (Ritter 1995: 51-52). 
The EIA is a consolidated development consent procedure, i.e. only one application has to be 
submitted, which is then evaluated and ruled on according to different laws in one process. It 
is possible to initiate a voluntary preliminary procedure by the project applicant. With that, an 
outline of the project and the environmental impact statement are submitted to and checked 
by the authorities that then give an opinion on deficits before the EIA process itself is started 
(§4). 
An EIA is mandatory for projects from different areas, but sometimes only when they exceed 
certain thresholds (in scope, size). There are 88 project types in three categories listed that 
have to undergo an EIA. For projects from the first and second category an EIA is required in 
each and every case, whereas for those from the second category a simplified procedure
13
 is 
applied. For projects from the third category, an EIA (simplified procedure) is necessary under 
defined conditions after a preceding case-by-case review. If projects do not meet the specified 
criteria for an EIA, the authorities have to decide, if a simplified procedure is necessary none-
theless (§3 (2)). Hydraulic fracturing is included under the first category and no threshold value 
is set, an environmental impact assessment is therefore obligatory in every case, even for test-
ing purposes. 
Public participation is one key objective of the EIA. Several actor groups have the right to par-
ticipate, to appeal, and the right of action; these include: neighbors, parties stipulated by the 
administrative provisions, municipals, citizens’ initiatives, the ombuds-office for environmental 
protection, the water management planning body, and environmental organizations (§19 (1)). 
However, participation might be hindered by a lack of financial and personal means (Neger 
2011: 229-231) or inclusion might happen too late in the process (ibid. 225-227). Furthermore, 
                                               
13 This does not require an environmental impact statement, but only a summary assessment 
of environmental impacts. 
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there is ongoing critique by the European Commission, that Austria does not fulfill article 11 of 
directive 2011/92/EU
14
. 
The EIA -Act 2000 is not aimed at research and innovation per se but rather at (bigger) con-
struction projects. The list of executed environmental impact assessments in Austria supports 
this estimation (Umweltbundesamt web). Since there are R&D areas like geo-engineering, that 
need to test their work on a larger scale in situ, it is nonetheless a policy instrument that has 
the capability to guide research and innovation in a certain – more environmentally friendly – 
direction. As the case of fracking in Austria shows, a continuous adaptation of the legislation to 
the technological development is necessary. 
In the end, no EIA on fracking was conducted in Austria in the case of fracking. The OMV 
claimed that its decision to stop R&D and their shale-gas plans in Austria was made because it 
is not economically viable. At the same time, they refer to an obligatory environmental impact 
assessment that “reassured” their decision. The mere necessity to conduct an EIA, together 
with the prospect of citizens’ protest, seems to have discouraged the OMV from implementing 
this potentially risky technology. 
Regarding fracking, the instrument of EIA might be a suitable form of RRI governance. It builds 
upon existing legislation and would only need to be modified. For politicians who want to rec-
oncile the interests of different groups, this is a way of finding consent without taking the side 
of one of the conflicting parties since the final decision on approval or rejection is made in a 
multilayered process that includes experts and stakeholders. It is a procedure to reconcile di-
verging different societal needs (e.g. sound environment and economic growth) and safety 
issues. Thus, it might be an instrument to manage contestation. On the downside, the EIA ap-
proach comes into effect relatively late in the whole process, when R&D is already conducted 
in the laboratory and fracking has to be implemented on a larger scale for testing purposes. 
MinroG – Mineral Raw Material Act 
The aspect of land and mineral rights ownership is important in the case of fracking and shale 
gas production, as well as to the development of new techniques (Wang and Krupnick 2012). 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) indicates that “state ownership of oil and gas rights can 
[…] reduce the incentives for communities to accept development of local unconventional gas 
resources” (2012: 122). 
                                               
14 According to an opinion by the EC from October 2013 sent to Austria (not published), the EC 
is not satisfied with the amendment of the EIA-Act in 2012, but demands further changes 
regarding the right of the public (individuals, general public, citizens’ initiatives) to intervene 
in the EIA procedure. 
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In Austria, property rights regarding and regulation of exploration and production of mineral 
resources are regulated in the Mineral Raw Material Act (MinroG  - “Mineralrohstoffgesetz”). 
According to the MinroG, hydrocarbons – like natural oil and gas (including shale gas) – are not 
owned by the landowner, but are federally owned (§4 (1) (2)). The Federal government can 
explore and produce these resources itself (§68) or allocate those rights to others (natural or 
legal persons or partnerships) for a mineral royalty (§69). The authority charged with the en-
forcement of this act (including authorization of mining) is the Federal Ministry of Economy, 
Family and Youth (§170) or in some cases the district administrative authority or the governor 
of the province (§171). 
The approval of the property owners has to be obtained and agreement on compensation has 
to be found (§ §147 and 148). Land can also be confiscated if there is a substantial public inter-
est in mining on the property or for safety reasons (§150). Among others, the obligation to 
protect life and health of persons, the environment and the surface is prescribed in the Min-
roG, for example in implementing state of the art technology (§109). The act also refers to 
other laws (i.a. UVP-G) that extend these requirements (§221a). As of January 2013, the OMV 
and the RAG
15
 hold the right for exploration, production and storage of hydrocarbons in Aus-
tria (BMWFJ 2013: 34). 
Looking at the framing of fracking by different actors it becomes clear, that even actor groups 
like local citizens initiatives’ that prioritize environmental integrity over pursuit of profit have 
economic interests. But whereas higher tax revenue and the generation of jobs in the region 
are brought forward as arguments for fracking and shale gas, direct financial benefits are not 
held out in prospect in the debate on fracking in Austria. 
But further inquiry into the actual impact of property rights is necessary to understand its ef-
fects on the societal assessment of fracking operations. A comparison of countries that differ 
in this regard – where minerals are properties of the landowner or monetary incentives for the 
authorization of fracking operations are granted – would be helpful. 
Austrian Energy Strategy 
In 2009, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Life published the Austrian Energy Strat-
egy (AES), also due to pressure from the EU in the form of its Climate and Energy Policy 
20/20/20 targets. The AES resulted from a participatory process, including actors from the 
federal and state governments, as well as stakeholders from science, business, environment 
and society (NGOs, Sozialpartner, special interest groups, etc.). Besides the responsible minis-
tries, the Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO) and the Chamber of Labor (AK) – both important 
Sozialpartner – were central actors in this process (Pezenka 2010: 137-147). 
                                               
15 „Rohöl-Aufsuchungs Aktiengesellschaft“ – Raw Oil Exploration Corportation. 
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The AES has three strategic pillars: energy efficiency, renewable energy, and security of supply. 
Its focus is to stabilize final energy consumption at the level of 2005. The core objective is to 
develop a sustainable energy system that secures energy supply, is environmentally compati-
ble, cost efficient, socially compatible and competitively viable (BMWFJ and BMLFUW 2010: 4-
12). 
The strategy contains concrete provisions in order to reach its objectives. These are compre-
hensive measures like adaptation of legislation (climate protection laws, ecologic tax reform, 
spatial planning laws, etc.), financial funding of R&D (energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
etc.), public awareness-raising, funding of and tax incentives for building and infrastructural 
measures, etc. (ibid. 42-96). In order to secure the energy supply, the stabilization or even 
increase in the domestic production of conventional sources of energy, like natural gas, as well 
as the expansion of infrastructure (pipelines) are deemed important – also to reduce depend-
encies on imports (ibid. 90-92, 118). 
The two main purposes of the AES are noticeable and interlinked: climate protection and eco-
nomic performance. However, these do not seem to be given equal importance. Climate pro-
tection is depicted as an important task that has to be pursued due to obligations towards the 
EU (ibid. 18) and ecological reasons., but in the end, measures that are environmentally friend-
ly and sustainable, including R&D, are represented as a necessary vehicle for economic growth, 
competitiveness and prosperity (i.a. BMWFJ and BMLFUW 2010: 5). This correlates with the 
observation by Fochler and Müller (2006: 15), that there is a strong conjunction between R&D 
and economic prosperity in Austrian policy documents. 
Furthermore, the AES is described as a “vision” of a maximal self-sustainable or even autarkic 
national energy system (BMWFJ and BMLFUW 2010: 5). This (explicitly and implicitly) refers to 
the ongoing debate about dependency on foreign (Russian) oil and gas. 
In regards to fracking, the AES provides a normative framework that has the potential to guide 
research, development and innovation in the area of energy, e.g. through financial funding. 
More generally, it also offers orientation in assessing the implementation of certain technolo-
gies. In the case of fracking, the Green Party referred to the AES, highlighting that shale gas is 
not a part of it (Der Standard 2012). Thus, it provides a rating scale for political decisions that 
can be used for criticism. The need for a determined strategy, to which decisions and activities 
can be linked and by which these can be justified, is brought to the fore when the OMV calls 
for an international shale gas strategy. 
RRI at the Mining University of Leoben 
RRI governance is not only facilitated by the government but also by different actor groups and 
organizations, for example at the Mining University of Leoben (MUL) where research on a new 
clean fracking approach is being conducted. 
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The MUL highlights sustainability as their major objective for the future in every item of the 
value chain (Montanuniversität Leoben 2012a: 5-6). In their development plan, the utilization 
of unconventional gas and shale gas are explicitly named as promising areas for R&D (ibid. 14-
15) 
In the curriculum for the study of Petroleum Engineering, the „responsibility towards the hu-
man society“
16
 as well as the environment are emphasized. Professional petroleum engineers 
are described as being empathetic, aware of the risks linked to their work, and acting in ac-
cordance with ethical standards. It is claimed that there are no designated lectures on ethical 
or ecological issues in the curriculum due to factual constraints (time limitations set by statuto-
ry provisions). Nonetheless, lecturers are advised to integrate ethics related issues and aspects 
in their regular teaching. Furthermore, students are encouraged to choose lectures with a fo-
cus on ethical and ecological issues as optional subjects (Montanuniversität Leoben 2013: 3-4). 
The MUL also plans to open a research, security, and teaching center at the Erzberg mine (Re-
search@ZaB), an open mine located in Styria. It plans to conduct teaching and R&D, including 
testing under real circumstances, also in the field of Petroleum Engineering (Montanuniversität 
Leoben 2012a: 24-25; Schibany et al. 2013: 63). This could potentially provide a way of reduc-
ing the risks of testing processes because there is a greater distance from local residents and 
the conditions are more controllable. 
The integration of reflections on the wider societal aspects of R&D in the training of new re-
searchers can be seen as a first attempt of responsibilisation. However, it is up to the individu-
al lecturers and students to include these considerations into the education process. Later, in 
practice, it is the responsible engineer that ensures that operations are conducted in a respon-
sible manner. Overall, responsibility seems to be individualized. 
The question remains, is this system of actual use regarding RRI governance or does there have 
to be a stronger implementation of measures in the curriculum (e.g. lectures on ecological 
issues) and a more systemic approach to responsibilisation (e.g. mechanisms that ensure the 
integration of societal and ecological considerations into the R&D process)? Another aspect is 
that of “window dressing”; in other words, are these measures serious attempts to responsibil-
ise future engineers and researchers or to pacify conflicts with other societal and political ac-
tors? Further inquiry in this regards is necessary. 
  
                                               
16 “Verantwortung gegenüber der menschlichen Gesellschaft”. 
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CSR Strategy of the OMV 
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) deals with the societal, ecological and 
economic responsibilities of companies. Furthermore, CSR strategies are self-imposed guide-
lines that should safeguard the implementation of measures to exercise these responsibilities 
(i.a. Bassen et al. 2005). Therefore, CSR is also relevant to the concept of RRI. 
The OMV determines their core values, strategies and guidelines for promoting corporate so-
cial responsibility (CSR) in several documents; these include a general code of conduct (OMV 
2011), a HSSE
17
-policy (OMV 2012b), their concept of Resourcefulness (OMV 2012), a code of 
conduct for lobbyists (OMV 2013b), and a brochure on business ethics (OMV 2012a). Further-
more, the OMV is a member of the Global Compact Network (web) and acknowledges the 
Austrian Corporate Governance Codex (Österreichischer Arbeitskreis für Corporate Govern-
ance 2012). 
The reason for the OMV to develop a code of conduct and begin CSR activities was public pres-
sure and criticism by NGOs because of their operations in Sudan during its civil war (Friesl 
2008: 104-105) 
The OMV defines their primary objective as the “production of oil and gas and the supply of 
millions of people with energy”18 (OMV 2011: 4) by implementing a “sustainable company-
policy” that includes “economy, ecology and societal responsibility”. As their “driving values” 
(OMV 2012: 8) they identify the integration of “social and environmental awareness” in deci-
sion-making, the promotion of CSR and sustainability, and being a partner to all affected 
groups. 
There are several focus areas in their Resourcefulness strategy, but regarding the case of frack-
ing, the part on eco-efficiency seems especially important because it includes carbon man-
agement (reduction of CO2 emissions), water management (reduction of water use, less envi-
ronmental impact), and the promotion of gas as the “cleanest fossil fuel” (OMV 2012: 13). 
Regarding “environmental management”, the OMV states that their “approach is based on 
precautionary, proactive management to minimize environmental impact” (ibid. 40). In their 
sustainability report, they list several activities to minimize environmental impact and risks 
deriving from operations; these include the increasing use of “integrated environmental and 
social impact assessment”, group wide implementation of standard processes to promote 
HSSE and compliance with legal regulations, improvement of energy management, decrease in 
air emission, increase in water management activities (efficient use, disposal, recycling), leak-
age prevention, waste reduction, etc. (ibid. 39-52). 
                                               
17 Health, safety, security and environment. 
18 „Die primäre Aufgaben des OMV Konzerns sind die Förderung von Öl und Gas und die Ver-
sorgung von Millionen von Menschen mit Energie.“ 
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It is difficult to assess to what extent operations comply with all of these strategies and wheth-
er they yield the desired effect. For example, the OMV admits to the leakage of 306,000 liters 
of hydrocarbons, that was “mostly caused by corrosion of aging infrastructure” (ibid. 47) but 
also present strategies to prevent such accidents from happening again. 
Overall, their top priority seems to be to make a profit. The Resourcefulness concept is de-
scribed as an enhancement to their profitable growth strategy. Even in their sustainability re-
port, their profitable growth strategy is described before (ibid. 7) their driving values and their 
concept of Resourcefulness (ibid. 9). This can be seen as an indication of the OMV’s priorities.  
Actor Landscape 
A variety of actors have been involved in the controversial debate over fracking in Austria. The 
actor landscape can be roughly divided into proponents (OMV, researcher) and opponents 
(environmental groups, Green Party, citizens’ initiatives) of fracking. The Federal Government 
occupies an intermediate position but is itself divided between the Ministry of Life (opponents) 
and the Ministry of Economy (proponents). Besides these, other actors (parties, regulatory 
bodies, companies, scientists, etc.) were involved in the discussions around fracking to a lesser 
extent and therefore will not be described in detail. 
The Actors 
OMV 
The OMV is a stock corporation and the biggest listed industrial company in Austria. It was 
founded in 1956
19
 as a state owned enterprise, but was privatized and restructured (to a stock-
company) in two steps in 1987 and 1989 (OMV 2013). In Austria, the OMV operates gas sta-
tions, pipelines, and a refinery. It has been producing oil and gas for 50 years now and in 2012 
covered about 10% of oil and 15% of Austrian gas consumption. The Austrian Industry-Holding 
Stock Corporation (ÖIAG), which is responsible for managing investments of the Republic of 
Austria and privatizations of nationalized companies, owns 31,5% of OMV stocks. The ÖIAG is 
state owned and controlled by the Federal Ministry of Finance. In 2012, the OMV paid a divi-
dend of 124 million Euros to the ÖIAG and 1,77 billion Euros in taxes; it also invested 332 mil-
lion Euros in the Austrian economy (ÖIAG 2012: 26-27). Hence, the OMV is important for the 
Austrian economy and the federal government. There have been several personal links be-
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 As Austrian mineral oil administration („Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung“). Weber (2012: 
197) points to the organizational basis of the OMV that was built earlier, during the time of 
the Nazi regime, using forced labor. 
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tween the OMV and the Austrian party system, but the current president of the OMV is not 
politically classifiable (Korom 2011; Die Presse 2009). 
The OMV carries out political lobbying, although the exact form that these activities cannot be 
determined. From January to July 2011, the OMV spent between 250.000 and 300.000 Euros 
for lobbying work at the European Union. In 2012, the OMV had two lobbyists at the European 
Parliament (Weis 2012: 14) and from mid 2013 to mid 2014, the OMV has three registered 
lobbyists (European Commission 2013). The OMV is also a member of different industry asso-
ciations that conduct lobbying at the European level. In Austria, there are five lobbyists that 
are officially registered (September 2013) for the OMV. The financial scale of lobbying activi-
ties, however, is not declared
20
. The actual purpose of lobbying activities cannot be assessed 
because the relevant entries are not publicly accessible. Further lobbying activities by the OMV 
are not documented. 
As a big corporation, the OMV follows the logic of the economic system and has an obligation 
towards its stockholders to maximize its profit (Weber 2012: 197). This logic is present in its 
self-portrayal, for example, in their 2021 strategy that is titled “Profitable Growth” (OMV 
2011a). It is also present throughout their sustainability report 2012, which portrays their con-
cept of Resourcefulness (OMV 2012). The OMV explicitly states that they want to secure envi-
ronmental protection in their operations. They determine this goal in CSR documents and put 
it forth in the debate around fracking. It is difficult to assess the extent to which statements by 
the OMV regarding their concept of Resourcefulness are credible or just a way to improve its 
corporate image or to gain public trust so that operations can be conducted without a public 
outcry – and in the end increase profit. Regarding the case of fracking in Austria, the attempt 
to develop a cleaner form of the technology has to be acknowledged as attempt to implement 
their CSR strategy. 
Researcher at the Mining University of Leoben 
Research on and development of a new and allegedly clean fracking method is conducted at 
the MUL, which is located in the province of Styria and is the only university of its kind in Aus-
tria. At the moment, the OMV is funding R&D as well as teaching in the area of petroleum en-
gineering.  This is partly the case because the OMV will need more qualified employees in the 
future. It is therefore investing 10 Mio Euros over a three-year-period
21
. In the past, the OMV 
has also funded teaching and R&D at the MUL, e. g. with 2 Mio Euro from 2006-2010
22
.  
Compared to other Austrian universities, external funds represent quite a high proportion of 
the MULs’ budged and an above average number of employees are financed mainly through 
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external funds (Elias and Pöchhacker-Trötscher 2012: 26-27). In 2012, 461 out of 1.158 em-
ployees (39,81%) were externally funded (Montanuniversität Leoben 2012: 45). Regarding the 
issue of fracking, two researchers from the Department for Mineral Resources and Petroleum 
Engineering appear in public: Gerhard Thonhauser and Herbert Hofstätter. 
Thonhauser is the director of a company located in Leoben that provides “data management 
and decision support tools for the petroleum industry”
23
. At the University of Leoben, he holds 
a chair in deep-hole-drilling. Furthermore, he published a number of research reports on shale 
gas production, several of which were on the Ukraine, and co-authored a report on the market 
impacts of shale gas for the European Commission (EC JRC 2012). As early as 2010, he held 
presentations on best practice in unconventional gas production and on building a shale gas 
industry in Europe
24
. 
Hofstätter worked in the oil industry for 27 years before returning to MUL. He holds several 
patents for drilling systems and methods
25
 and is professor for petroleum and geothermal en-
ergy recovery (derStandard.at 2012a). 
Work on fracking can bring the researchers economic benefits on several levels. Thonhauser, 
as director of a supplying company for oil and gas production, could benefit from the imple-
mentation of fracking in Austria as subcontractor. And for the MUL, cooperation with the OMV 
is necessary because they rely on external funding. Furthermore, the prospect of income from 
patents on a new fracking approach may be another incentive, although Hofstätter has on 
several occasions stated, that he would prefer this technology to be available for everybody 
without license fees so that more companies conduct environmentally friendly fracking (Agi-
tano 2012). A greater reputation in the scientific field might also be convertible into financial 
capital (research funding). But the researcher working on the clean fracking method says that 
his main motive is to conduct operations that are safe for the environment, because of his own 
role as father and his considerations regarding the future of his children. His interest in envi-
ronmental protection is also noticeable in his claim of not patenting the clean fracking ap-
proach in order to make it more accessible for others, thus making fracking operations world-
wide cleaner. 
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Federal Government 
When the issue of fracking was highly debated in Austria (2011-2012), a grand coalition be-
tween the Social Democrats (SPÖ – 29,3% of votes) and the Conservatives (ÖVP – 26,0%) was 
in power
26
. The SPÖ did not interfere much in the discussion on fracking in Austria, whereas 
certain actors from the ÖVP were at its center. 
In the debate on fracking and associated processes, two federal ministries were especially ac-
tive: the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (Ministry of 
Life) and the Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth (Ministry of Economy). Although one ma-
jor aspect regarding the introduction of fracking in Austria was the development of a clean 
fracking technology at an Austrian university, the Federal Ministry of Science and Research 
remained silent on the issue. 
At the time of the debate on fracking, the Federal Ministry of Economy was led by Reinhold 
Mitterlehner, who is a member of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). The ÖVP is known for its 
close relationship to the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and the Austrian Chamber of 
Agriculture. These are important actors (so-called Sozialpartner/Social Partners) in the neo-
corporatist landscape in Austria (Pelinka 2009: 628-630; Tálos and Kittel 2001: 64-69). Mitter-
lehner himself was general secretary for the Economic Chamber from 1992 to 2000 and deputy 
to the general secretary from 2000 to 2008. 
The Ministry of Economy is the responsible authority for granting oil and gas drilling permits in 
Austria according to the MinRo-G. Before the UVP-G amendment of 2012, they would have 
also been responsible for giving permission to the OMV to conduct hydraulic fracturing. With 
the amendment that made an EIA mandatory for fracking, the Ministry of Agriculture is now a 
competent authority as well. 
Like the Ministry of Economy, a member of the ÖVP, Nikolaus Berlakovich, led the Ministry of 
Life. The Ministry has been under attack several times because it made decisions in favor of 
farmers rather than the environment (Die Presse 2013). 
The economic interest of the Federal Government, including the involved Ministries, seems to 
have many facets. On the one hand, they have an interest in promoting the national economy, 
which might be made possible by lower energy prices as a result of fracking. Furthermore, as a 
shareholder of the OMV, the Federal Government might also be interested in increasing their 
revenue. On the other hand, fracking could be harmful to local branches of business (tourism, 
agriculture) that also contribute to the economy. In the end, politicians rely on being re-
elected by the population, so their public image is crucial to them. 
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Green Party 
Between 2008 and 2013, the Green Party was the third largest opposition party in the parlia-
ment. With 10,4% of votes, it was behind the right-populist Freedom Party (FPÖ, 17,5%) and 
the right-populist Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ, 10,7%)
27
. In Lower-Austria, where 
fracking operations should have taken place, the Green Party received 8,0% of votes in the 
national elections and 6,9% of votes in the state elections
28
. 
The Green Party defines ecology, solidarity, self-determination, direct democracy, non-
violence, and feminism as their core values (Die Grünen 2001: 6-10) and describes the promo-
tion of renewable energy as one of their goals (ibid. 24). In 1986, the Green Party entered the 
National Council for the first time, but the social movement out of which the Green Party 
emerged already started in the 1970s as a protest movement against Zwentendorf (Lower Aus-
tria). This nuclear power plant was built but never activated due to public protests that were 
supported by the media and led to a plebiscite in 1978; Griessler (2012: 75) describes the topic 
of nuclear energy as a “major taboo in Austrian science and technology policy”. Another im-
portant factor regarding the emergence of the Green Party and an active civil society in gen-
eral was the protest against the construction of a large hydroelectricity facility within an un-
touched floodplain near Hainburg by the Danube in Lower Austria in 1984 (Foltin 2004; Jordan 
2011; Pesendorfer 2007). 
The Green Party was among the first to react to the OMV’s fracking plans; it demanded more 
information and the adaption of existing regulation (EIA). Later on, they intensified their claims 
and are now insisting on a total ban of fracking and shale gas production. The Green Party 
functioned as a link between civil society and the political system, e.g. by supporting and sub-
mitting a petition to the National Council, and as actors from inside the political sphere by 
tabling the issue in state and national assemblies. 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
The main NGOs that have dealt with the topic of fracking and shale gas in Austria are Global 
2000 and Greenpeace (Austria). Both campaign for a clean environment by means of nonvio-
lent public activism, lobbying and outreach work. They are mainly financed by donations 
(Global 2000: 64% donations, 21% revenues, 12% funding
29
). To campaign against a technology 
like fracking, which (presumably) has very explicit effects – e.g., burning tap water – might be a 
strategy that supports their positive image, publicity and revenues from donations. 
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In regards to fracking in Austria, the NGOs published press releases conveying their critical 
opinion about the technology and its possible implementation in this particular case and in 
general. Their concerns were also picked up by and distributed through the media. They also 
tried to inform the local population by conducting information events, thereby cooperating 
with citizens’ initiatives (Greenpeace 2011a). At other opportunities (e.g. information events 
by the OMV), they conducted and/or supported protest rallies. 
Citizens’ Initiatives 
Citizens’ initiatives (Bürgerinitiativen - BI) emerged soon after the OMV’s announcement of its 
shale gas plans in Lower Austria. Citizens’ initiatives were located in communities potentially 
affected by shale gas production. Two of these were especially prominent in the discussions: BI 
Risiko-Gas and BI SCHIEFESgas. The focus will be on the latter because of its more extensive 
(internet) presence. 
The BI SCHIEFESgas describes itself as “non-partisan platform, which campaigns for a liveable 
wine district”
30
 by providing information from independent experts
31. In general, there is a 
noticeable distrust in the statements made by the OMV and other organizations and/or ex-
perts that speak out in favor of shale gas production. Activists from the initiatives also regard 
media organizations as biased because they rely on money from companies and organizations. 
Thus, searching for non-partisan information and asking critical questions are essential for 
them. In this regard, they assess the internet and local information events as important. 
Persons engaged in the citizen initiative BI SCHIEFESgas and other activists come from various 
backgrounds. An account for donations exists but no direct financial support by companies or 
organizations can be found. For some of their activities, the citizens’ initiatives cooperated 
with each other, NGOs, as well as with members of the Green Party. Furthermore, they gath-
ered endorsements for their cause from known artists, authors and intellectuals (see Bür-
gerinitiative SCHIEFESgas web). 
The citizens’ initiatives conducted information events – even before the OMV held its own 
events –, submitted a petition to the National Council to prohibit hydraulic fracturing in gen-
eral with support of the Green Party (Windbüchler-Souschill et al. 2012), initiated an ongoing 
signature collection against fracking, started other forms of symbolic action (protest rally, 
planting a resistance-tree) and have been active on social media and the internet (Bürgerinitia-
tive SCHIEFESgas web). 
Economic, environmental, and personal interests can all be identified as coming into play on 
the part of the citizens’ initiatives. Tourism and viticulture are important economic pillars of 
the region. Hydraulic fracturing and shale gas production pose a risk to these sources of in-
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come because of the potential destruction of the landscape and damage to the positive image 
of the region. Thus, the local population and its citizens’ initiatives have an economic interest 
in averting fracking and other gas producing operations. This is diametrically opposed to the 
interests of the gas producing company. The conservation of the value of their properties 
(houses, land) might be another factor, although no actual statement in this regard can be 
found. Another form of direct economic concerns can be identified: one of the speakers at 
their information event in July 2013 was the general manager of a company that builds wind, 
solar, biomass, photovoltaic and water power plants
32
. He seems to be exempted from the 
critique of pursuing his own financial interests by the members of the initiatives, whereas oth-
er actors (OMV, politics) are accused of doing so. In this regard, a distinction is made between 
short-term and long-term benefits of the energy technology, with gas production as a non-
sustainable energy classified as a short-term-solution that imposes environmental risks (OBS 
2013). 
The environmental interests of the citizens’ initiatives are closely linked to their economic, but 
also to their personal interests. They want to protect their immediate surrounding from dan-
gerous chemicals and toxins (e.g. contamination of cropland), thus maintaining sources of in-
come and protecting their health from potential toxins in the air, water and soil. They are talk-
ing about their “own” region, their “own” drinking water and their “own” children that would 
be affected by fracking. In this regard, the notion of the “future of our children” (Bürgerinitia-
tive SCHIEFESgas web; OBS 2013) is especially prevalent. 
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Framing of Fracking and Shale Gas 
The issue of fracking is inevitably linked with the issue of shale gas (or unconventional gas in 
general), the framing and assessment of this technology is therefore always linked with the 
assessment of shale gas as a source of energy. The framing of fracking, its assessment and the 
solutions different actors provide for problems raised by this technology are closely related to 
each other. 
Table 1 Framing of Fracking and Shale Gas 
 Proponents Fed. Government Opponents 
P
o
si
ti
ve
 
Security of Supply    
Independence     
Economic Growth    
Bridge Energy    
Lower GHG Emissions    
N
e
ga
ti
ve
 
Environmental Risks    
Negative Economic Impact    
Non-sustainability    
Dependence    
Higher GHG Emissions    
As depicted in Table 1, the framings of fracking and shale gas by proponents and opponents 
are strictly opposing, with the federal government being in an intermediate position. This is 
due to the split between the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Life; they adopt different 
positions towards the issue, but in the end take up the same (consensual) standpoint, which 
finds its expression in legislation (UVP-G amendment). 
Security of Supply 
A major concern and argument in favor of fracking concerns the security of energy supply. 
While the production of conventional oil and gas is declining, shale gas is described as a way of 
satisfying energy demand. This aspect is especially pushed by the OMV (i.a. profil 2012), but 
also by researchers (i.a. Wiener Zeitung 2011d) and the Ministry of Economy. The issue of se-
curity of supply is also closely linked to that of independence from foreign sources of oil and 
gas. 
National Independence 
Proponents claim that intensifying European production of gas could solve or at least ease the 
problem of dependence on foreign energy supplies – especially gas from Russia. This argument 
has to be considered in the context of repeated and politically motivated gas supply shortages 
caused by conflicts between Russia and the Ukraine and the other attempts by the OMV to 
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solve this problem, like the Nabucco pipeline (i.a. Kurier 2009, 2009a; Der Standard 2009, 
2009a, 2009b; Wiener Zeitung 2012b). 
Economic Prosperity and Growth 
Proponents depict shale gas production as a driver of the economy. Whereas in the USA and 
China the gas price has been declining and the economy has been stimulated because of shale 
gas, Europe is left standing and jobs – especially in the industry – are getting lost (“stagnation”, 
“downturn”). For the president of the OMV, the crucial question is not if a country wants to 
produce shale gas but if it wants to remain competitive (Der Standard 2012c; Kurier 2012e; Die 
Presse 2012; News 2012). Shale gas is therefore regarded as necessary to meet factual con-
straints. Researchers similarly describe the situation and see shale gas as a way of promoting 
economic growth and reducing national debt (Kurier 2011g). In line with this, the Minister of 
Economy even describes the energy price as more crucial for competitiveness than wages. 
Furthermore, an increase in domestic production would strengthen Austria’s position in nego-
tiations with foreign oil and gas suppliers (Die Presse 2013a). To emphasize the need of shale 
gas for competitiveness, voestalpine is named as an example by some. This Austrian steel 
company made a large capital investment in Texas (USA) because of the lower energy prices in 
the US (Kurier 2013b).  
Bridge Energy 
Natural gas is depicted as the cleanest and most important fossil fuel for the future, which is 
also emphasized in the OMV’s 2021 strategy (OMV 2011a) and by researchers from the MUL. It 
is presented as a solution to bridge the time gap until enough renewable sources of energy are 
available to meet energy demand and energy infrastructure can manage energy from such 
sources (profil 2012; Wiener Zeitung 2011d). 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Closely linked to the aspect of shale gas as bridge energy, is the use of shale gas as a means to 
lower GHG-emissions. The proponents of shale gas and fracking argue, often in reference to 
the US example, that replacing coal with shale gas, as source of energy, can instantly lower 
GHG emissions. Shale gas production would thereby positively contribute to climate-change-
targets. 
The aim of lowering GHG emissions is also questioned by some. The Minister of Economy 
states that it might be not a good idea to sacrifice industry, and the general welfare of a socie-
ty, in order to reach certain CO2 emission targets (Die Presse 2013a). 
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Environmental Risks 
NGOs, citizens’ initiatives and the Green party all frame hydraulic fracturing as a technology 
that imposes high risks on the health of local populations. High water consumption, pollution 
of drinking and surface water, use of dangerous chemicals and ability to induce earthquakes 
are mentioned as possible risks of fracking (i.a. Global 2000 2011; Greenpeace 2011; Bür-
gerinitiative Schiefesgas web; Die Grünen im NÖ Landtag 2011a). 
Members of the citizens’ initiatives say that they do not want their homeland to become an 
“experimental laboratory” for a new fracking approach or themselves to become “human 
guinea pigs” (OBS 2013). 
Negative Economic Impacts 
Especially citizens’ initiatives perceive their homeland and lifestyle as being at stake because of 
the potential negative effects of fracking on their health but also on tourism and agriculture 
(viticulture). They paint a picture of a region rugged by drilling rigs
33
, supply roads and pipe-
lines and contrast this construction with an idealized image of the landscape
34 (Bürgerinitiative 
SCHIEFESgas web)  
Non Sustainability 
Opponents of fracking consider shale gas to be a worse option than renewable and clean 
sources of energy like wind and solar power. Furthermore, they see the development of re-
newable energy as delayed by the international promotion of shale gas production (i.a. Global 
2000 2013). Citizens’ initiatives not only state that they want to develop their district in a sus-
tainable manner but also that they do not want to support climate change by letting exploita-
tion of fossil fuels happen (Bürgerinitiative SCHIEFESgas web; OBS 2013). They not only frame 
fracking and shale gas as a local but also as an international problem. 
Dependence 
Like the proponents of fracking, its opponents want to become more independent. While the 
proponents claim that producing shale gas is a way to become more independent from foreign 
oil and gas, opponents want to become independent from fossil fuels and from big energy 
companies. Members of the citizens’ initiatives therefore seek to produce energy at a local 
level, using wind and solar power and temporally transforming energy-surplus into hydrogen 
or methane in order to save it (OBS 2013). 
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Higher GHG-Emissions 
Besides the general environmental risks imposed by fracking, NGOs, the Green Party and citi-
zens’ initiatives also see the risk of higher GHG-emissions produced by this technology as a 
result of methane leakage (i.a. Global 2000 2011; Greenpeace 2011; Bürgerinitiative 
SCHIEFESgas web). 
How to deal with the »problem« of fracking? 
The fact that different actor groups frame fracking in different ways does not mean that they 
neglect specific aspects and possible effects of this technology. But there is difference in how 
they assess and address these issues. In this regard, two contradicting points of view can be 
identified when it comes to the question of how to best deal with the issue of fracking and its 
possible effects: regulation or prohibition. For each position, different actors and actor groups 
are called upon to act responsibly. 
Proponents of fracking claim that possible problems directly associated with fracking can be 
solved through R&D, the implementation of best practice and compliance with regulation. The 
government is called upon to regulate fracking and to formulate strategies that fit the as-
sumed economic and factual constraints. Companies are called upon to comply with existing 
rules and implement state of the art technology. 
Proponents depict the risk of environmental pollution as foremost a technical problem that 
can be solved by companies and researchers. The president of the OMV stated that his com-
pany would only conduct fracking in an environmentally friendly manner several times (i.a. Die 
Presse 2011b; Kurier 2012e), thereby addressing environmental concerns while at the same 
time casting aside fears of its negative impacts. Proponents point to R&D efforts that will min-
imize risks and make fracking a clean technology. A researcher from the MUL states that to 
conduct fracking in a benign way, comprehensive research to develop harmless materials, 
techniques and methods are necessary on the one hand. But, on the other hand, responsible 
engineers to implement state of the art technology and best practice are also essential. This 
responsibility can be promoted by means of education – e.g. at universities (Kurier 2013d). 
Besides technical aspects, there are also societal obstacles identified by proponents. The non-
acceptance of fracking is not seen as a problem deriving from the technology itself or from 
differing societal values and objectives but instead as a communication and information prob-
lem. The president of the OMV states that, “the population has to be informed in an objective 
and serious way about the technology and the ecological effects” (Wirtschaftsblatt 2012) and 
that it is necessary to have a factual discussion (Kurier 2011h). The challenge of public ac-
ceptance is also crucial for the Minister of Economy (Die Presse 2013a). The companies and 
politicians involved are called upon to raise acceptance, also by informing the public.  
Opponents of fracking do not believe the promise that a clean fracking solution can be found. 
They say that if an approach without chemical additives were possible and economically viable, 
then it would have already been used somewhere. Clean fracking is depicted as technically 
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impossible, e.g. because of the toxicity of produced water even if no chemical additives are 
used. In their view, direct environmental risks cannot be fully eliminated. Furthermore, a long-
term environmental impact, as a result of GHG emissions from gas combustion for example, 
cannot be ruled out. Hence, they demand that the government minimize potential risks and 
dangers deriving from fracking by banning it entirely and call upon the OMV to stop their op-
erations. They want the government to promote sustainable energy technologies (e.g. through 
R&D) instead of fossil fuels. Opponents of fracking do not address the researchers working on 
a clean fracking approach. 
Members of the citizens’ initiatives proclaim the necessity for alert and active individuals that 
take matters into their own hands, get unbiased information, and increase pressure on policy-
makers. This individualization of responsibility seems to be linked to a general distrust in poli-
tics, companies, and the media. 
Incompatible Positions 
The positions of proponents and opponents of fracking in Austria seem to be incompatible. 
Both groups of actors consider themselves as being right and as acting responsibly under the 
given circumstances. The incompatibility of positions derives from (1) different assumptions 
about the technology, the possibility to further develop it, and associated risks, benefits and 
uncertainties; (2) adverse interests (e.g., maintaining local business models vs. boosting the 
national economy); and (3) different views on the general pace and manner of development 
(sustainable energy now vs. later). The incompatibility manifests itself in different regulatory 
approaches. On the one side, supporters of fracking want to regulate fracking in order to min-
imize risks without obstructing R&D, implementation and economic competitiveness. On the 
other side, opponents of fracking want to prohibit this technology entirely and eliminate this 
potential source of risk. Instead, they push for sustainable energy technologies and local 
branches of the economy. 
In this situation, the federal government took a mediating position in tabling an amendment to 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act. On the one hand, this addresses opponents’ 
concerns over environmental risks by making an EIA of hydraulic fracturing mandatory even 
for testing purposes. On the other hand, it leaves the door open for fracking to be conducted 
in the future. In the end, the parties to the dispute are not satisfied. (1) The OMV abandons its 
plan to develop and implement clean fracking in Austria but continues to call for a European 
shale gas strategy. Although the OMV’s decision to stop fracking cannot be reduced to the 
amendment of the EIA, since there might be unknown underlying reasons, it seems that this 
was an important factor. (2) Opponents of fracking continue to speak out against fracking. For 
them, only a total ban can guarantee that no further attempts will be made by oil and gas 
companies to introduce fracking in Austria. 
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De facto Governance of RRI 
As shown, governance of fracking in Austria was facilitated in a dynamic process.  Although 
there were regulations in place that would have covered the OMV’s testing of a new fracking 
approach (MinroG), critics argue that these would not have been sufficient to prevent the neg-
ative effects. Furthermore, different societal stakeholders would thereby not have been in-
cluded in the decision making process. The adaptation of existing regulations (UVP-G) hap-
pened in an ad hoc manner after the technology had been introduced and protests had al-
ready started. The public and political controversy that was also spread by the media played a 
part in increasing the pressure on the OMV as well as the government. Given the incompatible 
positions of opponents and proponents of fracking, the Federal Government tried to strike a 
balance between their interests and suspended the actual decision on fracking. At the same 
time it made concessions; at least to some extent, public participation is now scheduled and a 
preceding review of the impact is mandatory. Although no actual EIA has been initiated, the 
mere prospect of such a procedure had an effect on decision making.  
An assessment of whether or not RRI has been facilitated in the case of fracking in Austria de-
pends on what is understood by responsible. Proponents of fracking might evaluate the out-
come of the process as irresponsible because the security of gas supply and technological de-
velopment are hampered. Opponents might see the mandatory EIA and the stopping of opera-
tions as a partial victory and responsible in regard to safety and sustainability. 
From a sympathetic perspective, the OMV’s initial attempt to improve fracking technology and 
to develop a clean approach could be regarded as being responsible behavior towards the 
environment and society. It can also be understood as an expression of CSR. The OMV stated 
that it wants to develop a clean solution, inform the public, and accomplish its goal of supply-
ing Austria with fossil fuels. Besides the obvious economic motives, the OMV’s strategy to in-
vest in R&D on a clean fracking approach might also have come about as a result of the specific 
circumstances. In general, Austrians are rather skeptical towards (new) technologies. The re-
sults from the Eurobarometer 2010 show that Austria ranks last in terms of general optimism 
towards new technologies
35 compared to other European countries (Gaskell et al. 2010: 15). 
Throughout Austrian history, there are examples for protests against large-scale projects that 
affect the environment (Zwentendorf, Hainburg). The OMV may have wanted facilitate ac-
ceptance for their plans in the first place by anticipate criticism because of negative environ-
mental impacts.  
From a more critical perspective, the process was not an open one that involved different so-
cietal stakeholders. Rather, the public was informed in a top down manner and confronted 
with fixed plans and a technology already under development. This led to a defensive attitude 
and distrust on behalf of the affected population. The social movement that followed, which 
                                               
35 Mean number of optimistic rated technologies out of eight is 3,8, mean number of pessimistic 
rated is 2,1, whereby in the EU27 these are 4,9 to 1,1. 
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consisted of civil society actors and opposing politicians, presented a solution to the problem 
that, given a negative and sceptic framing of the issue, appeared to be the only responsible 
option towards society in the long run. 
Building upon the analysis conducted in this study, several conclusions for Res-AGorA as well 
as RRI governance can be made: 
 The assessment of fracking by societal actors diverges depending on the temporal 
alignment, the spatial orientation, and the confidence in the compliance with regula-
tions and best practices of the actors. 
 It is one of the biggest challenges for an RRI governance framework to consider and to 
bring together these different interests, perspectives, and worldviews in regards to 
R&I and to find a way of dealing with (apparently) incompatible positions. 
 A certain level of trust is important to convey information and facilitate a dialogue in 
negotiation processes. In order to facilitate trust, it would be beneficial to increase 
transparency of decision-making process, implement participatory approaches (e.g. 
pTA), and provide information by independent organizations, which assesses opportu-
nities and risks of technologies in a non-partisan manner. 
 At the same time, public and political controversies can be important factors in initiat-
ing legislative efforts that promote RRI. 
 Adaptation of existing governance arrangements, like EIA legislation, might be appro-
priate and practical concerning R&D in certain areas. However, in the case at hand, no 
EIA was conducted. Therefore, its effectiveness is uncertain.  
 Prevailing societal conditions (such as the actor and media landscape, political circum-
stances, civil society, and general attitude towards technology, the environment, etc.) 
seem to be crucial and have to be considered. Further research is necessary to better 
understand their effects. 
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OBS 2013: Infoveranstaltung Schiefergas36. BI Risiko-Gas. 3 July 2013, 19:30-21:30. Weingut 
Willi, Brünnerstraße 16, 2120 Wolkersdorf.  
OBS 2013a: „Schwarzer Veltliner“ – Das Schiefergas-Theater – Ein Schwank in zwei Akten37. 
Screenplay and direction: Jürgen Marschal, Elisabeth Semrad. 07 October 2013, 20:00-
22:00. Palais Kabelwerk, 1120 Wien. 
  
                                               
36 Information event „shalegas“ conducted by the citizens’ initiative Risiko-Gas. 
37 Theater play „black veltliner – the shalegas theater – a farce in two acts”. 
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RAG Rohöl-Aufsuchungs Aktiengesellschaft (Crude Oil exploration corporation 
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